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DOES THE COMPENSATION CLAUSE BURDEN THE
GOVERNMENT OR BENEFIT THE OWNER? THE
COMPENSATION CILAUSE AS PROCESS
Joshua Ulan Galperin
INTRODUCTION
One of many ideas indelibly drawn in the legal vernacular is that "if
a regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."' This work-
horse of a phrase has shouldered the bulk of the regulatory takings
doctrine since the first half of the last century.' So much ink has been
spilled in an attempt to parse the meaning of "too far," and yet the
academic and judicial communities have made little progress towards
a better understanding.' This article, therefore, seeks to divert some
attention away from the meaning of "taking", and put a little more
focus on the function of "compensation" by looking to the language
of the Constitution and the fundamental purpose of the Takings
Clause.'
Trying to divine the fundamental purpose of any constitutional lan-
guage is a difficult task- where do we even start? One thing we can
say with some certainty is that much of the practical debate about the
Takings Clause surrounds compensation'-when must the govern-
ment pay a property owner for a loss or devaluation of property?
Thus, at the center of any practical analysis of the Takings Clause
should be the real purpose and meaning of "compensation. "6 Not
only how much compensation is 'just," but also when (under what cir-
cumstances) is compensation due at all.' This article proposes that
1. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
2. William Michael Treanor, Jam for Justice Holmes: Reassessing the Significance of
Mahon, 86 GiEo. L.J. 813 (1998).
3. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'1 Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 326 (2002) (noting that after eight decades following that deci-
sion "we still resist the temptation to adopt per se rules in our cases involv-
ing partial regulatory takings, preferring to examine a 'number of factors'
rather than a simple 'mathematically precise' formula.").
4. See generally Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YAu: L.J. 1077 (1993) [hereinafter
Usings] (referring to the text and history of the Takings Clause to divine a
suggested purpose of the Clause and proposing a new interpretation
thereof).
5. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Compensation for Takings: How Much is just?, 42
CATH U. L. Riv. 721, 722-24 (1993) [hereinafter Lunney).
6. See id. at 724-25.
7. See id. at 723.
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simply because property has been "taken," whatever that means, com-
pensation is not necessarily due.
The general thesis of this article is that the Compensation Clause of
the Fifth Amendment' is a procedural requirement, not a substantive
one, that is intended to burden the government and not benefit the
property owner. Hopefully, the continual focus on what regulations
amount to takings may be relegated to an academic question and the
question that both governments and landowners care about-whether
compensation is due-is given more importance.
Section I of this article will review two important authorities related
to regulatory takings and the analysis of the Compensation Clause:
Lingle v. Chevron" and Penn Coal."' Section II will introduce and ex-
plain a new approach to the intent and meaning of the Compensation
Clause. Section III of this article will address the implications of this
new interpretation proposed in the preceding section, including its
scope and exceptions.
I. THE FOUNDATIONS
In this section, I hope to provide foundations for my own thesis
based on more credible sources than myself. I will look to the United
States Supreme Court and try to demonstrate why contemporary case
law supports my argument.
Take note, however, that this section may not be of interest to you.
I hope to show that by separating substantive due process from tak-
ings, Lingle" took a step towards correcting the regulatory takings
framework and also may have demonstrated that Penn Coal" was de-
cided on invalid grounds. I wish to show this in order to blaze a
clearer trail for the arguments that I will make in the next section.
However, I do sincerely believe that those arguments will stand even
in the face of Penn Coal. Therefore, read this subsection if it interests
you, pass it by if you are willing to accept a change in takings doctrine
without the extra ornamentation.
A. Lingle: Regulatory Takings and Substantive Due Process
Lingle v. Chevron dealt with the respective roles of substantive due
process and regulatory takings." To combat high gasoline prices on
8. U.S. CoNs-r. amend. V (" [N]or shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation.").
9. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
10. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
11. Robert Dreher, Lingle's Legacy: Untangling Substantive Due Process from Tak-
ings Doctrine, 30 HARv. L. Rev. 371, 372 (2006).
12. See id.
13. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 531 ("This case requires us to decide whether the 'sub-
stantially advances' formula announced in Agins is an appropriate test for
determining whether a regulation effects a Fifth Amendment taking.").
2011] Does the Compensation Clause Burden the Government?
the Hawaiian Islands, the state enacted legislation prohibiting oil com-
panies from consolidating control over their retail service stations."
One affected oil company, Chevron, sued the state following the en-
actment of the new prohibitions." Chevron claimed that one mea-
sure, a rent cap provision, would reduce its income by over $200,000
per year and, therefore, amounted to a taking of its property.'"
In mounting its challenge, Chevron argued that the State's purpose
in prohibiting consolidation of gas stations was to prevent high prices
for consumers." Chevron did not question the validity of this pur-
pose, but it did insist that the rent cap would not advance it." Chev-
ron's argument concluded that because the regulation would not
"substantially advance" a legitimate use of the police power, i.e., re-
ducing retail prices of gasoline, it amounted to a taking of their prop-
erty." The District Court for the District of Hawaii agreed with this
argument and found that there was a taking of Chevron's property vis-
A-vis its reduced profits.20
When this issue reached the Supreme Court, the Court was not
faced with the factual question of whether the law actually did substan-
tially advance a legitimate purpose.2 ' Rather, it took up a broader
question-whether the "substantially advances" test has any role in de-
termining if a law affects a taking.22 Looking only to Supreme Court
precedent, it was perfectly clear that the test had become an impor-
tant part of the doctrine.2 3 However, the circumstances in Lingle
forced the Court to take a critical look at the logic of its precedent
and at the basic language of the Constitution in order to decide ex-
actly what the roles of substantive due process and regulatory takings
were. 24
Justice O'Connor, writing for a unanimous Court, approached the
question by looking first at the meaning and purpose of regulatory
takings,25 and then, separately, by looking at the origin of the "sub-
stantially advances" test.26 By approaching the question this way, the
Court discovered two incompatible ideas. First, the idea that "property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation"2 ' does
14. Id. at 533 (citing HAw. REv. STAT. § 486H-10.4 (1998)).
15. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 533.




20. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Cayetano, 57 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1014 (D. Haw. 1998).
21. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 532.
22. Id.
23. See id. at 540; see also Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922) (dis-
cussing the limited public interest of the law in that case).
24. Lingle, 544 U.S. 528.
25. Id. at 536.
26. Id. at 540.
27. U.S. CONST. amend.V.
29
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not mean that taking property for public use is unconstitutional; it
merely means that the government must compensate if there is a tak-
ing." Second, with respect to the "substantially advances a legitimate
state interest" test, the Court stated that it is:
a means-ends test: It asks, in essence, whether a regulation of
private property is effective in achieving some legitimate pub-
lic purpose. An inquiry of this nature has some logic in the
context of a due process challenge, for a regulation that fails
to serve any legitimate governmental objective may be so ar-
bitrary or irrational that it runs afoul of the Due Process
Clause.2 9
When a law affects a taking, compensation is due." When a law
"runs afoul" of the Constitution, it is invalid and cannot be en-
forced." Thus, if a law does not pass the "substantially advances" test,
it cannot be a taking because it is not valid law.3 2 This is the logic
behind the holding in Lingle, but the holding is simply that the "sub-
stantially advances" test is a substantive due process test, not a valid
takings test.33
B. Penn Coal: What Was Really Behind the Birth of Regulatory Takings?
If substantially advancing a legitimate state interest "is not a valid
method of discerning whether private property has been 'taken' for
the purposes of the Fifth Amendment,"" then what was the basis of
Penn CoaP This storied and revered case is the foundation of regula-
tory takings, yet all we take from it is two short words: "too far." In this
subsection, I hope to dust off this soot-covered case and suggest that,
in the wake of Lingle, this case has barely a pillar of coal on which to
stand.
Pennsylvania Coal Company ("Penn Coal") owned surface and min-
eral rights to a parcel of land." In 1878, Penn Coal sold the surface
rights of that parcel but expressly retained the right to mine all the
coal under the surface." The buyer also took the parcel "with the risk,
and waive [d] all claim [s] for damages that may arise from mining out
the coal" beneath the land.3 7
28. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 536.
29. Id. at 542.
30. Id. at 538.
31. See id. at 543 (stating that when a law is impermissible, "[n]o amount of
compensation can authorize such action.
32. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543.
33. Id. at 548.
34. Id. at 542.
35. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412 (1922).
36. Id.
37. Id.
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In 1921, the state of Pennsylvania passed the Kohler Act, which pro-
hibited any coal company from mining under property in any way that
would remove all coal and cause a home to collapse." Since, after the
1878 sale, Penn Coal owned only mineral rights in the parcel in ques-
tion and a house on the surface was still owned by a private individual,
the Act would not allow Penn Coal to fully exploit its mineral rights
because doing so would cause damage to the home." This prohibi-
tion limited Penn Coal's ability to extract the full value from its min-
eral property, and so it sued the State.40
When this case reached the United States Supreme Court, the
Court first noted that "the statute is admitted to destroy previously
existing rights of property and contract."4 ' The Court thus stated the
question as "whether the police power can be stretched so far."" This
is the first indication that the Court was not setting up a strong foun-
dation for regulatory takings. As we now understand it, the general
test for regulatory takings is whether a regulation is "so onerous that
its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster."43 By start-
ing with a question of police power, the Penn Coal Court was not giv-
ing paramount importance to "the magnitude or character of the
burden" or even how the "burden is distributed."" Rather, the Court
was beginning with a question of the Act's basic permissibility. But as
Lingle made quite clear, "[t] he Takings Clause presupposes that the
government has acted in pursuit of a valid public purpose."" And so,
looking merely at the question presented, Penn Coal does not begin
with a strong basis in what has become known as regulatory takings
doctrine."
It is not only the question presented, however, that demonstrates
the problems of Penn Coal's reasoning. What a further reading of Penn
Coal demonstrates is that the Court was undertaking a balancing test;
it was balancing the public purpose against the extent of the harm
done to the property interest. The Court states: "The extent of the
public interest is shown by the statute to be limited . . .. On the other
hand the extent of the taking is great.""
38. See id. at 412-13 (citing Kohler Act, 1921 Pa. Laws 1198 (1921)).
39. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412-13.
40. See id. at 413.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005).
44. Id. at 542.
45. Id. at 543.
46. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
47. Id. at 413-14. Further, it is worth quickly discussing what I imagine to be the
etymology of the phrase "on the other hand." Though this is probably not
a surprise, the physical act of placing pros and cons in one hand or the
other is a substitute (or perhaps a metaphor) for a weight scale (picture the
scales ofjustice if you will). The fundamental purpose (since I have already
used that phrase ad nauseam) of a scale is to balance one thing against an-
31
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The Penn Coal Court dedicated quite a bit of energy towards demon-
strating that the Kohler Act did not serve a legitimate state interest.48
For instance, the Court found that "damage to such a house is not a
public nuisance," and, therefore, the protection of such a house is not
a legitimate state interest.49 Continuing this line of argument, the
Court also found that the Act "is not justified as a protection of per-
sonal safety.5 o That could be provided for by notice."5 Finally, and
perhaps most tellingly, the Court found that "[t]he extent of the pub-
lic interest is shown by the statute to be limited, since the statute ordi-
narily does not apply to land when the surface is owned by the owner
of the coal."52
It is important to keep in mind that Lingle's condemnation of the
"substantially advances" test is not only a denunciation of the test as it
applies to the effectiveness of the law. The "substantially advances" test is
merely a shortened name for the substantive due process test, that is,
it "substantially advances a legitimate state interest."" The first half, "sub-
stantially advances," is a question of effectiveness, while the second
half, "a legitimate state interest," is a question of police power.5 ' Lin-
gle strikes the entire test from the takings analysis.55 Thus, when the
Court in Penn Coal looks at how far the police power can be stretched,
it is undertaking a substantive due process analysis, not a takings
analysis.
The Penn Coal Court's focus on the public interest, police power, or
state interest, however it is phrased, is a focus on substantive due pro-
cess, and on an area of reasoning that Lingle has since ruled to be
separate and apart from regulatory takings. In fact, it is somewhat of
a surprise that Penn Coal has been viewed as such a strong underpin-
ning for regulatory takings when even that Court emphasized that
"the act cannot be sustained as an exercise of the police power."" If
other. And so, when the Court considers one fact and then a second fact
"on the other hand" it is necessarily applying a balancing test. See Tahoe-
Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
302-03 (2002) ("Although this Court's physical takings jurisprudence, for
the most part, involves the straightforward application of per se rules, its
regulatory takings jurisprudence is characterized by 'essentially ad hoc, fac-
tual inquiries,' (citation omitted) designed to allow 'careful examination
and weighing of all the relevant circumstances'. . . ."). On the other hand,
if "necessarily" is too strong a word, you might only call this a "rule of
thumb".
48. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413-14.
49. Id. at 413.
50. Id. at 414.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 413-14.
53. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 528, 540-41, 548 (2005).
54. Id. at 540-42.
55. Id. at 548.
56. Id. at 540-42.
57. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414.
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the act was not a valid exercise of police power, then the act should
have been overturned. Recall that Lingle stated," [t] he Takings Clause
presupposes that the government has acted in pursuit of a valid public
purpose."" Therefore, if the act were overturned, Penn Coal would
be permitted to mine all of its coal." If Penn Coal could mine its
coal, its property rights were not limited.o If its property rights were
not limited, then no question of takings would arise because no prop-
erty was taken.6'
With all this in mind, it certainly seems that Lingle implicitly over-
rules Penn Coal. Lingle explicitly holds that substantive due process
and takings are two distinctly different areas of law with different con-
sequences.62 And since Penn Coal's reasoning is weakened, if not de-
stroyed, it might now be easier to accept that the current
understanding of regulatory takings, which stems from this uncertain
decision, is not well grounded in the case law or in the Constitution.
Before I proceed, I will try to state exactly what I hope you have
taken from this section: the takings doctrine is very confusing. Lingle
v. Chevron should have been an important step towards clarity, there-
fore it should not be overlooked. The value and precision of Lingle
comes from the Court's review of the logic behind the Takings Clause.
Moreover, Lingle's holding seems to draw into question the reasoning
behind Penn Coal, the case on which the doctrine of regulatory takings
is based. If I have made a convincing argument that even Penn Coal
does not stand on valid Constitutional footing, then perhaps there is
good reason to reassess the common understanding of regulatory
takings.
II. COMPENSATION AS PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
The Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been read
as a command to compensate any owner whose private property is
taken for public use.6 ' However, I will argue in this part that the Com-
pensation Clause is not a substantive command, but is rather intended
to be one aspect of procedural due process. The Clause is intended to
act as a procedural safeguard that will be a barrier for government. It
slows the act of condemnation, allows more consideration by the gov-
ernment actors, and functions as a computing device through which
government can calculate its action not only based on its desire for
property but on financial grounds.64
58. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543.
59. See Mahon, 260 U.S. 393.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 536.
63. Id. at 536-38.
64. Mark Fenster, The Takings Clause, Version 2005: The Legal Process of Constitu-
tional Property Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 667, 709 (2007) ("Judicial en-
33
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In other words, compensation helps protect property because of the
cost and the burden it imposes on government, not because of the
benefit it provides to an individual whose property the government
has taken."
In this Section, I will lay out three arguments for this view of the
Compensation Clause. In Subsection A, I will demonstrate that the
context of the Clause within the Fifth Amendment establishes a proce-
dural, rather than substantive, command. In Subsection B, I will lay
out the historical arguments for viewing the Clause in this manner.
Finally, in Subsection C, I will lay out the logical arguments that help
to pull this thesis together.
A. The Constitutional Basis
A simple reading of the Fifth Amendment is the first indication that
the Compensation Clause is about procedure." The Fifth Amend-
ment protects individual liberties through its five major clauses, which
are safeguards in the form of outright prohibitions or protective pro-
cedures." These safeguards are: (1) the grand jury indictment; (2)
the prohibition of double jeopardy; (3) the prohibition on self-incrim-
ination; (4) the Due Process Clause; and (5) the Takings Clause.68
In reading these safeguards it is easy to distinguish between those
that are complete prohibitions and those that are mere procedural
safeguards. The two outright prohibitions, placed next to one an-
other, each contain a single command: "nor shall any person be sub-
ject for the same offence to be twice put in double jeopardy of life and
limb, nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself."" The rest of the amendment deals with procedural
safeguards, which are written in an almost mathematical formula: A
shall not happen without P, where "A" is the government action that
deprives an individual of liberty or property and "P' is the procedural
safeguard.70 Thus, "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital,
forcement of the 'public use' and 'just compensation' clauses can serve as
external checks that force such takings to be productive and wealth-
enhancing.").
65. SeeJones Truck Lines, Inc. v. Price Rubber Corp., 182 B.R. 901, 909 (M.D.
Ala. 1995).
66. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1896 (9th ed.
2009) (Procedural Law is defined as "[t]he rules that prescribe the steps for
having a right or dutyjudicially enforced, as opposed to the law that defines
the specific rights or duties themselves.").
67. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) ("Procedural due process im-
poses constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of
'liberty' or 'property' interests within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment."); see generally U.S. CONsT.
amend. V.
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or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment
of a Grand Jury."" The "held to answer" is the government action,
and the indictment is the procedural safeguard. Likewise, "nor shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property" encompasses a number of gov-
ernment actions that shall not happen "without due process of law."72
Finally, for our purposes, "nor private property be taken for public
use," is the government action, "without just compensation," is the
procedural safeguard."
Each of the procedures noted in the Fifth Amendment are de-
signed as safeguards against a deprivation of property or liberty.7 4
This is an important point because these safeguards are not individual
ideas existing because they are somehow intrinsically important.
Rather, they were crafted by the Framers of the Constitution in order
to protect individuals from arbitrary or thoughtless deeds by unac-
countable government agents.7 ' The Compensation Clause is not ex-
empt. The Clause is an intentional procedure designed to protect
against arbitrary or thoughtless condemnation of property.
This might not be a drastically different view of the Clause than you
previously held. Still, as will be discussed in Section III, understand-
ing that the compensation requirement is a constitutional procedure
has consequences that do not receive much attention in takings
doctrine.
B. The Historical Basis
In order to better support the assertion that the compensation is a
procedural requirement, I will also draw your attention to the histori-
cal context of the Fifth Amendment's Compensation Clause. Richard
Epstein has said he "fear[s] that history offers us too much informa-
tion, without a means of sorting it out. The best evidence of those
historical views that won out are those found in the Constitution it-
self."7 7 In order to narrow our focus, I started with the triumphant
71. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See United States v. Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 282 U.S. 311,
327 (1931) ("[Plrivate property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation and that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law.").
75. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 130
S.Ct. 2592, 2602 (2010) ("[T]he Takings Clause bars the State from taking
private property without paying for it, no matter which branch is the instru-
ment of the taking.").
76. SeeJones Truck Lines, Inc. v. Price Rubber Corp., 182 B.R. 901, 909 (M.D.
Ala. 1995).
77. Richard A. Epstein, History Lean: The Reconciliation ofPrivate Property and Rep-
resentative Government, 95 COLJM. L. REV. 591, 592 (1995) [hereinafter
Epstein].
35
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text, but now I now turn to history to support, rather than prove, my
thesis.
James Madison authored the Compensation Clause." During the
drafting of the entire Constitution, and later the Bill of Rights, a ubiq-
uitous tension between liberalism (focused on individual rights) and
republicanism (focused on the common good through strong govern-
ment) shaped the drafters' ideas.7 With the Compensation Clause,
Madison reached a compromise between the two philosophies." The
Compensation Clause does not prohibit the taking of private property
as the liberal philosophy may have preferred."' Nor does it allow
unencumbered or uninhibited taking of property as the republican
philosophy may have preferred." Rather, the Clause protects private
property without prohibiting condemnation." But how, exactly, did
Madison intend for the Clause to protect property?
The Takings Clause was designed to protect private property by al-
lowing its condemnation only for public use and by requiring com-
pensation." According to Madison, the purpose of compensation was
not limiting in the way that public use is limiting.8 Rather, compensa-
tion, as a mandatory procedure, serves some less direct purposes.
Chiefly, Madison wrote that " [p] aper barriers have a tendency to im-
press some degree of respect."" According to Madison, "paper barri-
ers" were less than prohibitions but sufficient to limit government
action. One can see that a paper barrier and a procedural safeguard
are, therefore, one and the same.
The Compensation Clause is a paper barrier because it is not a pro-
hibition of or even a limitation on takings. Rather, the Compensation
Clause is a paper barrier that serves at least three purposes enumer-
ated by Madison." Madison wrote that the Clause is: (1) a basis for
judicial review-the courts may, for example, review compensation to
assure that it is just; (2) a shaper of public opinion-the cost of con-
demnation will temper the desire of a state to take property; and (3) a
tool for education-the process of calculating and negotiating costs
78. E.g., William Michael Treanor, The Origins and Oiginal Significance of the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L. J. 694, 694 (1985)
[hereinafter Treanor].
79. Id.
80. Epstein, supra note 77, at 594.
81. See Treanor, supra note 78.
82. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V; see also Treanor, supra note 78.
83. Treanor, supra note 78, at 712.
84. E.g., Epstein, supra note 77, at 593.
85. Treanor, supra note 78, at 712-13.
86. James Madison, Speech Proposing the Bill of Rights (June 8, 1789), in THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 197, 207 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rut-
land eds., vol. 12 1979) [hereinafter PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON].
87. Id. at 204-05.
88. Treanor, supra note 78, at 711-13.
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can alert the public, and the condemning authority, to the true value
of taking private property.89
By designing a mechanism that would protect property through
procedure, rather than prohibition, Madison pleased both liberals
and republicans."o However, the compromise is not one that is much
respected today. The Compensation Clause, when viewed as merely a
payment for the sake of payment, is often considered weak and insuffi-
cient.91 If the historical understanding of the Clause is better under-
stood, it may diminish some contempt for the Clause. It will also
better resolve an important conflict in the Compensation Clause. That
conflict, discussed in the next Subsection, is between the purpose of
the Clause and the value of compensation.
C. The Logical Basis
The conflict that I hope to resolve in this Subsection is this: com-
pensation for property, when viewed as a substantive command rather
than a procedural safeguard, is not the same as protection of prop-
erty. This is not a matter of pure textual interpretation or historical
understanding. It is a matter of reason and logic. Therefore, the rea-
son and logic analysis has waited until the end of this Subsection, even
though, to my mind, it is the most compelling reason for a new view of
the Compensation Clause.
Without intending any disrespect to the Framers, the Constitution
is not primarily a logical document. The clear meaning and historical
context of language in the Constitution must be a more authoritative
basis for legal argument than logic. If logic alone demonstrates a fail-
ing in the Constitution, then the result should probably be an amend-
ment, but not a construction that does violence to the language and
history of the document. Nevertheless, when logic comports with lan-
guage and history, it should be viewed as an additional source of sup-
port for the proffered construction. In this case, text and history
provide the basis for an argument, but logic bestows the most power-
ful substantiation.
Money is, of course, a form of property, but from an economic and
a practical perspective, money is merely a store of value that simplifies
the process of exchanging property. Presumably, when one speaks of
protecting property, one does not mean to protect just the value of
property, one means to protect the nature of property or a specific
89. PAPERS OFJAMES MADISON, supra note 86, at 207; see also Treanor, supra note
78, at 710-13.
90. See Treanor, supra note 78.
91. Gideon Kanner, "[Unlequal justice Under Law" The Invidiously Disparate Treat-
ment of American Property Owners in Taking Cases, 40 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1065,
1088-89 (2007) [hereinafter Kanner].
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piece of personal or real property." When I speak of the nature of
property, I mean the so-called fundamental rights in property that are
often recognized." Physical possession of property, for example, has
been called "the most cherished prerogative, and the most dramatic
index, of ownership of tangible things."" Likewise, Professor
Michelman captures the general understanding that it is "self evident"
that property is more than just value." It is, rather, the ownership of
"several discrete 'things' whose destiny [the owner] controls."" Fi-
nally, though this is not an exclusive list of the several natures of prop-
erty, Professor Michelman also writes that the right to use property for
the generation of income in an "economically beneficial or produc-
tive way " is fundamental."
To fully follow the remainder of this Subsection, there is one simple
premise on which we must agree: that the purpose, or at least a pur-
pose, of the Compensation Clause is to protect private property."
This premise does not seem to me to be a very controversial point, but
I want to be explicit that I am working from within this assumption.
Now consider the word "protect." If we look at property, as courts
and commentators have, through the lens of fundamental rights, we
must realize that compensation is not protection; compensation is
92. This economic view of property is certainly valid. However, it does not
agree with any interpretation of the Compensation Clause. See generally Lun-
ney, supra note 5, at 721-22. Consider this: from a purely economic stand-
point, compensation, if complete, is more than just a protection of
property, it is the property itself, transformed, into a new store of value, the
dollar. Property, whether liquid, real, or personal is still property. See gener-
ally Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998). Thus, from the
pure economic standpoint, the Compensation Clause is more than a pro-
tector of property; it is a transformer of property. Under this view, property
cannot be taken, and this Clause is really not a Takings Clause, but a Trans-
formation Clause. That, alone, would be an imaginable interpretation of
the Constitution, the Compensation Clause exists to assure that property is
never taken, that it is merely transformed. However, two additional factors
demonstrate that this view is untenable. First, to many people, and histori-
cally, property, land in particular, is more than its worth in dollars, it is the
source of all their wealth and independence. Kanner, supra note 91. It is
also a set of fundamental rights that go beyond mere value. (More on this
in the text). Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 170 (1998). Sec-
ond, there would be no need for the limitation of the Public Use Clause if
property were merely being transformed. If the Framers saw the Compen-
sation Clause as forcing a mere transformation of property then there
would have been no need for the limitation that the government only take
property for public use because there would be no harm done to a person
whose property is not taken, but merely transformed.
93. Usings, supra note 4, at 1097.
94. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of 'Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1228 (1967).
95. Id. at 1234.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 1167-68; see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-
16 (1992).
98. E.g., Treanor, supra note 78, at 694.
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merely consolation." Compensation only pays an owner for the de-
struction of his rights to exclude, control his property's destiny, or
earn money through his property.1 00 Put in terms of first year prop-
erty courses, the owner is paid when one of the sticks in his bundle is
taken, but the stick, in fact, is still taken. 01 Compensation does not
protect that property in the way that a militia, for example, may actu-
ally help an owner maintain fundamental control over his property, or
in the way that a Constitutional prohibition would fully prevent the
state from taking over property.1 0 2 Compensation is not a protection
in itself. By way of an analogy, if you purchase a china doll, the origi-
nal owner, through the purchase price, has, of course, been compen-
sated. However, you may then take a hammer or an angry bull to the
doll and the compensation has done nothing to protect that actual
piece of property even though the previous owner was fully compen-
sated. In a transaction of real property, the land will probably still
exist after the government takes possession, but the "private" aspect of
"private property" has been destroyed, and compensation alone has
failed to protect that private interest.'0o
Realizing that compensation is only a consolation for taking away
property rights, it becomes clear that compensation, as we currently
recognize it, does not protect private property.1'o This is where the
conflict between purpose and perception arises. However, compensa-
tion does protect private property when it is viewed as a procedure to
help stop or slow condemnation. That is, when it is viewed as a paper
barrier that serves any or all of the purposes Madison intended. 0 5
When this view is accepted, the seeming conflict is rectified: govern-
ment is slowed and possibly dissuaded from taking the property and
99. E.g., Epstein, supra note 77, at 594 ("[T]he state's ability to force the surren-
der of property, but by purchase and not by expropriation, negates the
holdout power of the individual.").
100. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
101. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435-36
(1982).
102. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536 (2005) ("[T]he Takings
Clause 'does not prohibit the taking of private property, but instead places
a condition on the exercise of that power.").
103. See Gideon Kanner, "Fairness and Equity" or Judicial Bait-and-Switch? It's Time
to Reform the Law of 'Just" Compensation, 4 ALB. Gov'T L. REv. 38, 39 (2011)
("[T]he time is at hand to refocus on the long-festering problem of inade-
quacy of 'just compensation' payable when private property is taken for
public use.").
104. Of course, property rights advocates have realized this, and so, they have
sought changes in the law that would make it more difficult to take prop-
erty even with compensation. See David King, Eminent Domain Changes Seek to
Limit State's Power to Seize Property GOTHAM GAZETTE (Feb. 04, 2010), http://
www.gothamgazette.com/article/albany/20100204/204/3170; see also Ben-
jamin Spillman, Bid to change eminent domain law gains traction, LAs VECAS
REv. J. (Feb. 17, 2011, 11:44 AM), http://www.lvrj.com/news/push-to-
change-eminent-domain-law-gains-traction-i 16418024.html.
105. See Treanor, supra note 78, at 710.
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the property is therefore protected."o' As a matter of fact, this conflict
is not the only thing that is rectified, so too is the entire riddle of
regulatory takings.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS: WHY SOME REGULATORY TAKINGS
DO NOT REQUIRE COMPENSATION
If I have convinced you that the Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment is a matter of procedural due process, then the next
question to ask is what difference it will make to the law generally. It
is not merely a change of understanding; on the contrary, it will
change the doctrine of takings. It is well established that legislatures
are not beholden to the due process standards in the same way as
executive and judicial actors.' 7 "When the legislature passes a law
which affects a general class of persons, those persons have all re-
ceived procedural due process-the legislative process."' With re-
spect to takings law, this means that the Compensation Clause, as a
matter of due process, does not apply to legislative acts, which are
considered regulatory takings. 109 The legislative process serves as due
process, meaning that due process simply does not apply to legisla-
tures; therefore, the Compensation Clause does not apply to legisla-
tive activity.' 10 With that in mind, so-called "regulatory takings" have a
limited basis in the Takings Clause.
Even though it is well settled law that legislatures are not obligated
by due process," in the next Section I will still seek to further sup-
port this fact in order to drive home the conclusion that compensa-
tion for many regulatory takings is not constitutionally mandated.
A. Legislative Due Process
Lord Coke explained that the words "due process of law" are meant
to "guarantee[ ] the rights of the subjects against the oppression of
the crown."" 2 Reference to "crown" is exceedingly important, be-
cause it highlights a distinction between the decrees of a royal execu-
tive on the one hand and the "customary laws of the English people,
or laws enacted by the Parliament" of which the English people "were
106. SeeJones Truck Lines, Inc. v. Price Rubber Corp., 182 B.R. 901, 909 (M.D.
Ala. 1995).
107. Ronald D. Rotunda & Jone E. Nowak, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE §17.8(c) (4th ed. 2011) [hereinafter Rotunda].
108. Id.
109. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'1 Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 323-24 (2002).
110. See id.; see also Rotunda, supra note 107.
111. See Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1877); see also Rotunda, supra note
107.
112. Davidson, 96 U.S. at 101.
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a controlling element," on the other hand."' Protection against the
rather undemocratic crown was seen as a necessary protection,
whereas protection against the Parliament or protection from custom-
ary laws of the land was not so imperative because both of the latter
were laws that the people, either directly or through representatives,
shaped themselves." 4
It is easy to see that when the great barons of England wrung
from King John, at the point of the sword, the "concessions
that neither their lives nor their property should be disposed
of by the crown expect as provided by the law of the land....
It was not in their mind[ ] to protect themselves against the
enactment of laws by the Parliament of England."'
In other words, having no need for protection from themselves,
there was no intention of having procedural safeguards apply to the
laws of the land."'
Turning to a more modern history of the Unites States, there is an
abundance of evidence that due process, particularly with respect to
takings, does not apply to legislative actions."' Dean Treanor notes,
for instance, that in all the early state constitutions that addressed tak-
ings, consent was required before property could be condemned."'
However, that consent could come from the property owner or the
legislature."' Whether true or not, the legislature was, and is, as-
sumed to be a protector of the people it represents and, through elec-
tions, it is accountable to those same people.o2 0 Because legislatures
were representative and highly accountable, special procedural pro-
tections were only needed to defend against encroachments by the
less representative and less accountable executives.' 2'
Case law is also rife with recognition that procedural due process
does not apply to legislatures, at least when the legislative act in ques-
113. Id. at 102. This sentence, you will now certainly understand, is a balancing
between the executive and the legislature because it uses the phrase "on
the other hand." If you do not understand, see note 36.
114. Davidson, 96 U.S. at 102.
115. Id.
116. See id. In fact the Barons had already established for themselves sufficient
control over the law making process that they had no need for procedural
safeguards. The early feudal courts, a precursor to English Parliament, was
entirely composed of chamber of the very Barons who opposed KingJohn's
distraint. WILLIAM STUBBS, LECTURES ON EARLY ENGLISH HISTORY 346-47
(Arthur Hassall, 1906).
117. See Treanor, supra note 78, at 698.
118. See Treanor, supra note 78, at 698.
119. See Treanor, supra note 78, at 698.
120. See Treanor, supra note 78, at 700.
121. See Treanor, supra note 78, at 700.
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tion is generally applicable.12 2 This distinction begins with Londoner 2"
and Bi-Metallic.12 1
In Londoner v. Denver, Plaintiffs were homeowners who had been
assessed a tax to raise funds for improving the street in front of their
homes.1 5 The Board of Public Works undertook the assessment,
which applied only to a set of specific landowners who would benefit
from the improved roadway. 12 ' The Plaintiffs complained that the tax
was invalid because they were not notified of either the assessment or
a hearing to contest the results. 127 The Plaintiffs argued that the fail-
ure to grant notice and a hearing was a denial of their due process.12"
The Court agreed. 29 justice Moody, for the Court, wrote:
where the legislature of the State, instead of fixing the tax
itself, commits to some subordinate body the duty of deter-
mining whether, in what amount, and upon whom it should
be levied, and of making its assessment and apportionment,
due process of law requires that . . . the taxpayer shall have
an opportunity to be heard.'3 0
Under this holding, there are two problems with the tax in ques-
tion. First, it was set by a "subordinate" body, that is, a body that is not
sitting as a representative of the people, but rather, as a representative
of the executive responsible for tax collection.'"' The first problem,
succinctly, was that a non-legislative body set the tax.12 Second, the
decision applied only to a limited number of individuals, not because
of the narrow scope of the act, but because the body specifically se-
lected the very individuals to whom it would apply.' The first
Londoner principal is the basic and important idea on which this arti-
cle is based: legislative process is due process while executive action
requires additional limits.' The second principal, dealing with the
generality of a law, however, adds a complication to the very idea that
legislatures are immune from due process requirements.' I will deal
with this second principal in more detail in Part B.
122. Londoner v. City and County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908); Bi-Metallic
Inv. Co. v. Bd. of Equalization of Colo., 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
123. Londoner, 210 U.S. at 373.
124. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co., 239 U.S. at 441.
125. Londoner, 210 U.S. at 374.
126. Id. at 375.
127. Id. at 385.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 386.
130. Id. at 385.
131. Londoner, 210 U.S. at 385-86.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 385.
134. Id. at 385-86.
135. See id. at 375, 384.
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Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. Bd. of Equalization of Colorado validates the
Londoner line of reasoning.' 3 6 In that case, the State Board of Equaliza-
tion for the state of Colorado raised their valuation of every single
property in Denver.1 3 7 Relying on Londoner, the Plaintiff objected that
sufficient procedural safeguards were not in place.' 8 The Court
framed the question in this way: do "all individuals have a constitu-
tional right to be heard before a matter can be decided in which all
are equally concerned?"'" Thus, the Court recognized that this case
was not exactly the same as Londoner because the assessment affected
the entire city equally; there was no individual selection of properties
to be burdened.140 The Court then held:
Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it
is impracticable that everyone should have a direct voice in
its adoption.... Their rights are protected in the only way
that they can be in a complex society, by their power, imme-
diate or remote, over those who make the rule.'
Through this holding the Court recognized both principles stated
in Londoner. First, specific selection can lead to injustice, 2 and due
process is designed to assure that when specific selection takes place,
there are reasonable safeguards.' 4 3 In Bi-Metallic, the act applied to
everybody, so there was no need for the additional safeguard of a
hearing.' 44 The Court also recognized that the people have power
over elected officials insofar as elected officials can be voted out.1 5
However, in Bi-Metallic, as in Londoner, it was not a legislative body that
imposed the tax.146 Thus, Bi-Metallic stands for the idea that a general
act may be spared from due process requirements, whether or not it is
legislatively enacted.1 47 We may also understand that legislatures, as
accountable bodies, are generally immune. 148
If an individual claims that a government action is a taking, or if a
government body is asking themselves whether an action will be a tak-
ing, the practical analysis should hinge not on whether the action is a
taking, but whether compensation will be due. There is no reason to
proceed through a treacherous taking analysis if we can determine at
136. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. Bd. of Equalization of Colo., 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
137. Id.
138. See id. at 444 (complaining, as the plaintiffs in Londoner did, that there was
no opportunity to be heard before the assessment of their land).
139. Id. at 445.
140. Id. at 445-46.
141. Id.
142. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co., 239 U.S. at 445-46.
143. See id.
144. Id. at 446.
145. Id. at 445.
146. Id. at 443. Londoner v. City and County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 375
(1908).
147. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co., 239 U.S. at 445.
148. Id.
43
44 University of Baltimore Journal of Land and Development [Vol. I
the outset that compensation will not be due even if there has been a
taking. Thus, the following elements must be answered to determine
whether compensation is due: (1) is the actor un-elected; (2) is the act
individually selective; and (3) is the act a taking under current takings
standards? Only if all three of these elements are answered affirma-
tively is takings compensation due. Thus, if the first and second ele-
ments are answered in the negative, the final and most complicated
element need not be answered at all. If the actor is elected and the act
is broadly applied, not individually selective, then there is no need to
worry about whether the act "goes too far" and amounts to a taking
because, even if it is a taking, the due process of compensation is not
due. Of course, it would be too easy to say that the first two elements
are completely black and white. They are only relative to the difficulty
of deciding whether something is a taking under current doctrine. We
can easily answer whether an actor is elected or not, but there is some
ambiguity as to when legislative acts involve specific selection.
B. Scope and Exceptions
Recall from the last Subsection this quotation: "[w]hen the legisla-
ture passes a law which affects a general class of persons, those per-
sons have all received procedural due process-the legislative
process.""' This is not new. It is well understood that the "Supreme
Court long ago established that when the legislature extinguishes a
property interest via legislation that affects a general class of people,
the legislative process provides all the process that is due." 5 o I am
making no new arguments about due process in the legislative realm,
but I am making a new argument about what should be considered
part of due process. So, if my thesis about the Compensation Clause is
accepted, and this rule of legislative due process is understood, one
must recognize that legislation depriving individuals of property, in
most cases, does not require the procedural safeguard of compensa-
tion. However, in some cases a legislature may pass a law that does not
affect a general class of people and there are cases when non-legisla-
tive or non-elected bodies are responsible for depriving the owner of
that property. When either of these possibilities occurs, process-spe-
cifically compensation-is due.
Ultimately, this caveat does not change the fundamental argument
that I have presented in this article. This general issue deserves brief
comment, however, since the distinction between general and specific
legislation is not crystal clear. Likewise, the legislative process at a lo-
cal level, where many takings conflicts originate, is rarely as straight-
forward as it is at the state and federal level. Thus, a comment about
149. Rotunda, supra note 107.
150. McMurtray v. Holladay, 11 F.3d 499, 504 (5th Cir. 1993).
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the local land use process and a review of several historic takings cases
to assess the specificity of the government act are useful.
When legislation applies to a large group of individuals, the com-
pensation safeguard is irrelevant."' When legislation applies very nar-
rowly, to one or only a few specific individuals, compensation might
be due.' 52 With respect to the local governing process, the rub is that
the boards and commissions responsible for making decisions about
private property are often intertwined and sometimes unelected.15 s
Councils, boards of aldermen or selectmen, zoning commissions, zon-
ing boards of appeals, planning boards, wetland boards, and coastal
commissions are just a few of the possible local bodies that may be
responsible for making significant decisions about use of private prop-
erty. In any given jurisdiction, any combination of these bodies may be
elected or appointed. It should go without saying that the primary
safeguard of the legislative process is the electoral process.
For example, consider a decision by an unelected park commission
that the east side of town should become a park. That decision might
amount to a taking, no matter how legislative the decision, no matter
how broad and prospective, compensation might be due because the
opportunity to vote out the decision makers does not exist. Do not,
however, assume that actions of an unelected body will automatically
require compensation. If the decision maker is not insulated from
due process, than we must move to the standard takings analysis. That
is, compensation is still only due if there has actually been a regulatory
taking. 5' Turning an entire side of town into a park probably will
amount to a taking, and as the decision maker is not elected, compen-
sation would most likely be due. On the other hand, if the decision
turns one municipally-owned lot into a landfill, despite the unelected
actor, the neighbors probably do not have a legitimate takings claim
based on the landfill-related diminution in property value. 5 5
151. Londoner, 210 U.S. at 385-86. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co., 239 U.S. at 445-46.
152. Londoner, 210 U.S. at 385-86. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co., 239 U.S. at 445-46. This
situation assumes that the elected body even has the authority to pass
highly specific or selective legislation. For instance, at the federal level, bills
of attainder, and bills of pains and penalties are constitutionally prohibited.
U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 9. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 441 (1965).
153. Rotunda, supra note 107 at §17.8(c) ("[A]n administrative agency may
make decisions that are of a legislative or general rulemaking character...
[h]owever when the agency makes rules that might be termed adjudicative
in that they affect a very defined group of interests, then persons represent-
ing those interests should be granted some fair procedure to safeguard
their life, liberty or property.).
154. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
155. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 330 (2002) (quoting Lucas v. South Carolina, 505 U.S.
1003, 1019 (2002) ("The categorical rule that we applied in Lucas states
that compensation is required when a regulation deprives an owner of "all
economically beneficial uses" of his land. Under that rule, a statute that
"wholly eliminated the value" of Lucas' fee simple title clearly qualified as a
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Conversely, an elected body, the zoning board of appeals, may
make a very specific decision to deny a variance. If this amounts to a
taking, compensation will be due, not because of the nature of the
board, which in this example is elected, but because the decision, as
with any variance, is a narrow one, applying to one parcel of land and
one landowner. When this is the case, there is insufficient public inter-
est to arouse the democratic process, and hence, that legislative safe-
guard is not effective; compensation is due.
Now moving back to the federal government, there are a number of
historic cases that provide good illustrations of the actor-scope para-
digm. Because the history of takings analysis is so muddled, it is often
difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain what factors are determinative
parts of a court's analysis. Thus, we cannot say that the following cases
were necessarily decided because of the nature of the actor or the
scope of the action, but we can at least regard these cases as useful
examples for parsing out, in particular, which government acts are
individually selective and which are not.
Mugler v. Kansas is a classic case of prohibition.' When the Kansas
legislature passed a law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of all
intoxicating beverages, Mr. Mugler was forced to close the doors of his
brewery.15 ' This is a very simple case of a general law passed by an
elected actor.15 ' The offending regulation came directly out the Kan-
sas legislature and was directed very broadly at "anyone, directly or
indirectly" who would "sell spirituous, vinous, fermented, or other in-
toxicating liquors. . ."'" Mugler was not specifically selected as a tar-
get for this prohibition." 0 The Court in Mugler found that there was
not a taking of his property, and that decision was based in part on the
fact that the people of the state deemed an "absolute prohibition"
through their "chosen representatives."' There is no telling what the
outcome might have been had this case revolved around a partial pro-
hibition (perhaps only against beer manufacturers who sold unpalat-
able mass-produced light lagers) and if that prohibition were
promulgated by an unelected executive body (the elite "Better Beer
Task Force"). As it happens, this case involves a very general act
taking. But our holding was limited to "the extraordinary circumstance
when no productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted."
The emphasis on the word "no" in the text of the opinion was, in effect,
reiterated in a footnote explaining that the categorical rule would not ap-
ply if the diminution in value were 95% instead of 100%. Anything less than
a "complete elimination of value," or a "total loss," the Court acknowl-
edged, would require the kind of analysis applied in Penn Central. Lucas,
505 U.S. at 1019-1020, n. 8").
156. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
157. Id. at 656.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 656-57 citing Gen. Stat. Kansas, 1868, c 35 § 5.
160. Mugler, 123 U.S at 623.
161. Id. at 662.
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passed by an elective body and in the end, no taking was found and no
compensation was due.'6 2
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, in which all brick manufacturing was legisla-
tively prohibited,'" Miller v. Schoen, in which the Virginia legislature
ordered the destruction of all red cedar trees, in proximity to apple
trees, and infected with a certain rust, 1 4 and Goldblatt v. Hempstead, in
which dredging and pit excavation were prohibited within town lim-
its' 65 are all examples of the simplest type of legislation, where the
legislature passes a broadly applicable law and is therefore insulated
from the requirement of compensation.16 In each of these cases, no
compensation was due.'
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chicago, presents an-
other arrangement, in which there was an elected actor, but the regu-
lation was specific."' In this case, the City Council of Chicago, by
ordinance, approved the widening of a city street and the taking of
the Railroad's property for that endeavor.' 69 That is, an elected body
specifically selected the road that they would enlarge and the property
that they would take in order to enlarge that property. 7 ' This case is
not a challenge of that specific regulation because the court under-
stood that where specific selection of this type occurs, compensation is
due."' This is nothing more than a process of eminent domain con-
demnation initiated by the legislature, as opposed to regulatory tak-
ings, or inverse condemnations which have been the focus of this
article. This case rose to the Supreme Court because there was a ques-
tion of how much compensation was due.' 7 2 There was some amount
due for the condemnation of land, but the Railroad also argued that
by expanding the road, and by moving their rail yard closer to a pub-
lic road, they would be subject to other regulations that address rail
operations in proximity to public areas.'7 3 Because the condemnation
resulted in a new swath of regulations becoming applicable, there was
a cost to the Railroad above and beyond the cost of the actual prop-
erty that was taken, and the Railroad argued that compensation was
due for this cost as well.' 7 4
162. Id. at 664.
163. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
164. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1927).
165. Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1961).
166. Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 413; Miller, 276 U.S. at 280; Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 591.
167. Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 413; Miller, 276 U.S. at 280; Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 591.
168. Chi., Burlington and Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1896).
169. Id. at 230.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 228.
173. Id. at 251-52.
174. See Chi., Burlington and Quincy RK. Co., 166 U.S. at 251-52.
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The Court reasoned through quite a bit of case law, almost all of
which holds that due process of law requires compensation."' In the
Court's words, " the legislature [cannot] take private property for pub-
lic use without just compensation.. ."7 It certainly appears through
this quote that the court is challenging my thesis that if a legislative act
amounts to a regulatory taking, compensation is not due.'7 7 In fact,
the Court cites a number of cases that seem to make the same
point: a legislature can no more take property without compensa-
tion than a transportation secretary or school superintendent. How-
ever, the point that I believe the Court is really making in this case is
the truism that affirmative condemnation, eminent domain, which by
rule requires specific selection of each piece of property to be taken,
requires compensation.' 7 1 In making this point, Chicago, Burlington ac-
tually reinforces the idea that specific selection requires compensa-
tion, but that general legislative activity does not;so "[t]he
requirement that compensation be made for private property taken
for public use imposes no restriction upon the inherent power of the
State by reasonable regulation to protect the lives and secure the
safety of the people."'"' In other words, the state owed compensation
in this case because it specifically selected the Railroad's property for
use." Thus, specific selection trumped the otherwise broad power of
the legislature.'
We have now covered cases in which elected officials make gener-
ally applicable decisions, and cases in which elected actors make spe-
cific decisions. The case of Andrus v. Allard is one in which an
unelected actor makes a generally applicable rule.' 84 The conflict in
this case arises from a generally applicable prohibition on the sale of
eagle feathers that was established by the unelected Department of
the Interior.' 5 Ultimately, compensation was not due in this case be-
cause the court determined that no taking had occurred, not because
of any reasoning related to the general applicability of the rule or the
nature of the actor.186 Nonetheless, this case does demonstrate a situa-
tion in which an unelected actor can promulgate a generally applica-
ble rule. 8 7 Even though the rule is legislative in nature, the
175. See, e.g., id. at 235-36.
176. Id. at 238 (emphasis added) (quoting Sinnickson v. Johnson, 17 N.J.L. 129,
146 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1839).
177. See id. at 241.
178. See, e.g., id. at 237-39.
179. Id. at 235-36, 256.
180. See Chi. Burlington and Quincy R.R. Co., 166 U.S. at 252, 255-56.
181. Id. at 252.
182. See id. at 255-56.
183. See id. at 236.
184. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
185. Id. at 54.
186. Id. at 51-52.
187. See generally Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
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government would owe compensation if the rule effected a taking,
which in this case it did not.' 8
The remaining type of action is one in which an unelected actor
specifically selects a property owner, and the case of United States v.
Causby demonstrates this situation.' The Causbys owned a home and
a small farm in North Carolina.9 o At some point, a military airport
began operations very near the farm, and the frequency and proxim-
ity of landing aircraft made living on the property and operating the
farm impossible."' Here, the actor that made decisions not only
about the location of the airfield, but the frequency, altitude, path,
and other flight related information were unelected military person-
nel.19 2 Likewise, the decision to fly over the Causby's farm amounts to
specific selection because it was not merely an implementation or ap-
plication of objective standards or broadly applicable rules. 93 Rather,
the decision to land aircraft in a certain way must specifically consider
the landing path and height that would affect the Causby farm, just as
selecting the route of a new road must specifically consider the indi-
vidual homes in its path.' 94
The lesson here is that specific selection need not be malicious."'
Perhaps a good way to define specific selection is to refer again to
eminent domain, where an identifiable individual is selected, not for
broad policy reasons, but for strategic reasons such as cost or engi-
neering where the actor has prior knowledge that each option will
affect different property owners.' 96 The military had a number of
flight paths it might have chosen. Any of those paths would have bur-
dened some property owners, and in choosing a path, whether based
on wind, the built environment, available airspace, or some other fac-
tors, the military knew that different landowners would be burdened
differently.' 97 The Causby property was not chosen for any broad pol-
icy reason, only for the specific benefits that flying in that path would
provide.198
Miller v. Schoene is a good jumping-off point for some more nuanced
discussion. The facts of Miller are this: cedar rust was spreading
through Virginia, severely damaging the population of apple trees.' 99
188. Id. at 64-65.
189. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1945).
190. Id. at 258.
191. Id. at 256.
192. Id. at 260.
193. See id. at 258-59.
194. See id. at 265.
195. See generally Causby, 328 U.S. at 259 (explaining that flight paths are deter-
mined based on prevailing wind patterns and therefore did not target the
Plaintiffs land specifically).
196. Id. at 259.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277 (1928).
49
50 University of Baltimore Journal of Land and Development [Vol. 1
This disease was hosted by red cedars, but affected commercial apple
trees, hence a law that called for the destruction of all contaminated
red cedars within a set radius of an apple orchard was passed. 200 The
state entomologist was charged with carrying out the identification of
such offending cedars."0 ' This case is useful because it demonstrates
two important principals of general versus specific selection.
First, it can be difficult to judge when an act is sufficiently general,
and I cannot offer a method for drawing a bright line between general
and specific selection. In this case, comparable to Mugler or Hadacheck,
for example, the regulation applied only to a small group of red cedar
owners who owned infected trees and were within a certain radius of
apple orchards.202 It is impossible to know exactly how many property
owners this affected.20 3 Mr. Miller may have had the only such popula-
tion, or he may have been one of hundreds of red cedar growers. In
order to judge whether a legislative act is sufficiently broad, I can offer
only one important thought. As a statute becomes more specific -
from "all red cedars" to "all infected red cedars" to "all infected red
cedars within one mile of an apple orchard" to "all infected red cedars
one mile from an apple orchard on land bordered by a lake" to "all
infected red cedars one mile from an apple orchard on land bordered
by a lake which is larger than 5 square miles" - determining whether
the regulation is too selective should probably be based on the logic of
the increasingly specific qualifications. Where the qualifications force
application of the regulation onto a very narrow group, the law might
be challenged and defeated as a matter of substantive due process.204
Regulating infected red cedars that are close enough to infect apple
trees seems to advance a legitimate government interest.205 Regulat-
ing the same trees that are on a large lake probably would not have
any rational relation to the stated goal of the legislation.201 If there is
not a substantive due process challenge, the same logical analysis can
be conducted to determine if the legislation is so specific that it does
not offer normal protections of the legislative process. 207 That is, if
legislation is limited in scope to a point of not furthering its stated
goals, then the law should be regarded as specifically selective, and
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some process other than the legislative process is due to the regulated
parties.
The second principle of general versus specific selection high-
lighted by Miller is how a law is applied. 20 8 In Miller, the state entomol-
ogist did, in fact, specifically select Mr. Miller and demand the
destruction of his cedars. 209 This gives the impression that a non-
elected actor was responsible for selecting whose property should be
regulated. This is not the case, however, because the entomologist was
not given any independent discretion .2 10 The entomologist was simply
charged with determining whether the specific conditions of the legis-
lation were met, and if they were, with assuring the destruction of the
infected trees.21' The point here is that the actor on the ground is not
the same as the actor who makes the policy decisions with which the
Takings Clause is concerned. When one is assessing whether there has
been specific selection, it is also important to determine the amount
of discretion given to each decision maker.
To further illustrate the point about discretion, we can turn to a
familiar example. Imagine this scenario: a city on the East Coast of the
United States has a great deal of history in its landscape. Residents of
that city have clearly indicated that preserving this history is a top pri-
ority and they believe that safeguarding historic buildings is one prac-
tical way of so doing. Thus, the city council, an elected body, passes an
ordinance creating a historic landmark commission, which is made up
of appointed experts on law, history, architecture, real estate, city
planning, and other pertinent disciplines. This board is tasked with
selecting properties that they feel are of notable historical impor-
tance. Board members are guided by the intent of the city ordinance,
but they do not make objective decisions in which they merely select
all the buildings that meet legislatively defined criteria. That is, unlike
the state entomologist in Miller, they may select some buildings and
not others, even if the buildings have similar significance. This is more
a matter of taste than of science.
Of course, when a specific building is selected for preservation, the
owner of that building is at a disadvantage. The city might direct
money to the building owner, in order that they can maintain the
building in its historic character, but that does not cover the devalua-
tion of the building that will result from the burdensome restrictions.
These restrictions are part and parcel of maintaining the building es-
sentially as it is and has been throughout history.
If this regulation does amount to a taking, is compensation due?
Yes. We are dealing here with a situation where a body is both
unelected and very clearly taking part in specific selection that entails
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almost endless discretion. Perhaps the fact pattern here is familiar to
you, even though the outcome is not? That's right, Penn Central; an
opinion that, if fairly judged a taking, would have been compensable
under this new framework. 1
CONCLUSION
I do not mean to imply that Penn Central was wrong. The Court
looked at several factors, of which "character of government action"
was only one, and the Court decided that no taking occurred.2 13 This
character element, one could argue, is similar to the framework I have
proffered in this article. However, this framework is only applicable
when something is already deemed a taking. The question that this
article poses is: if a regulation amounts to a taking, is compensation
due? In Penn Central, the Court found that the regulation was not a
taking in the first place, and so, the question of compensation did not
arise.21' But what is the point of all my long-winded investigation if the
entire takings analysis must proceed before the question of compensa-
tion arises? What does this tome provide in the way of simplification?
If simplification is the goal, we simply reverse the question. The only
reason any landowner or government cares whether an action is a tak-
ing is because they want, or want to avoid, compensation. So, simply
ask first: if this were a taking, would compensation be due? If the an-
swer is "no," then there is no need to continue with the inquiry, be-
cause the terminal question-compensation-is already settled. If the
answer is that compensation would be due, then the unwieldy, un-
pleasant, and uncertain inquiry into how far is too far can continue.
Part of the motivation for this article focusing on compensation is
because compensation is the public and the government's real con-
cern in a takings conflict. Because of this focus, I would be amiss if I
did not give at least brief attention to another very practical and popu-
lar issue in takings law: fairness. One will undoubtedly see that this
article suggests that government can regulate property, even to the
point of fully devaluing that property, but the landowner may not be
compensated. Is this fair? The simple and practical answer is that this
is a question for legislatures to answer. What I hope to have demon-
strated is that the Constitution does not require compensation in situ-
ations where we might now expect it, but the Constitution also does
not prevent a legislature from enacting policies that they believe will
inject more fairness into takings law."
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